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The Crisis of the Sciences
In § 2 of The Crisis of the European Sciences and Transcendental
Phenomenology (1936), Husserl bemoans science’s loss of its
significance for life (“Verlust ihrer Lebensbedeutsamkeit”):
The exclusiveness with which the total world-view of modern man, in the
second half of the nineteenth century, let itself be determined by the positive
sciences . . . meant an indifferent turning-away from the questions which are
decisive for a genuine humanity . . . : questions of the meaning or
meaninglessness of the whole of this human existence. (1970, 5–6)
In § 9, he traces this loss back to Galilei’s mathematization of
nature:
But now we must note something of the highest importance that occurred
even as early as Galileo: the surreptitious substitution of the mathematically
substructed world of idealities for the only real world, the one that is actually
given through perception, that is ever experienced and experienceable—our
everyday life-world. (48–49)
The Crisis of Science Scientific Metaphysics Lessons for the Current Debate
The Phenomenological Response to the Crisis
Mathematics and mathematical science, as a garb of ideas, . . . represents
the life-world, dresses it up as “objectively actual and true” nature. It is
through the garb of ideas that we take for true being what is actually a
method . . . (51)
This objectivistic self-misunderstanding of physics subsequently
spreads throughout philosophy and the sciences, with particularly
detrimental effects in psychology (§§ 10-27).
As a “science of the life-world” (§ 34), transcendental phenomeno-
logy is supposed to overcome this self-misunderstanding and
consequently to restore to the sciences their significance for life.
. . . in the form of universal, responsible science, in which a completely new
mode of scientific discipline is set in motion where all conceivable
questions—questions of being and questions of norm, questions of what is
called “existence”—find their place. (298)
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Pure Theory as a Guide to Life?
But how can the phenomenological approach restore this
life-orienting role of science?
Jürgen Habermas (“Knowledge and Human Interests”, 1965, Sect.
III) suggests the following reconstruction:
1 By pointing to the life-world as the (forgotten)
meaning-fundament of natural science, phenomenology
undermines the objectivism of the sciences.
2 Instead of naïve objectivism, phenomenology brings with it a
truly theoretical attitude, which no longer suffers from an
unacknowledged dependence on practical interests.
3 This attitude engenders a novel sort of practice, rendering
humanity “capable of an absolute self-responsibility on the
basis of absolute theoretical insights”.
Habermas accepts 1 and 2 , but criticizes Husserl’s notion of
theory that underlies the step from 2 to 3 .
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The Hidden Cosmology in Classical Theoria
The demand that theory ought to be life-orienting originates in
the platonic notion of mimesis: having grasped the cosmic
order through theorizing, the philosopher brings himself into
accord with it.
This presupposes two elements, only the first of which is
retained in the phenomenological approach:
1 the theoretical attitude, which transcends the interests of
everyday life,
2 the ontological assumption of a structure of the world
independent of the knower.
Husserl could only justifiably ascribe a life-orienting role to
theory if he were to accept the second element as well:
Theory in the sense of the classical tradition only had an impact on life
because it was thought to have discovered in the cosmic order an ideal
world structure, including the prototype for the order of the human world.
Only as cosmology was theoria also capable of orienting human action.
(Habermas 1965 [2005], 313)
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Contemporary Scientific Metaphysics
The Main Idea
“. . . to explore what a metaphysics looks like that is judged by
scientific standards and that avoids appeals to intuition” (Kincaid
2013, p. 1)
(2007) (2013)
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Scientific Metaphysics and Husserl’s Phenomenology
Some obvious points of disagreement:
According to scientific metaphysics, there is no crisis of the
sciences. Rather, there is a crisis of philosophy insofar as it
ignores the methods and the results of science.
Consequently, there is no acceptable method of philosophy
beyond the methods accepted in the sciences (in sharp
contrast to the methodology of transcendental
phenomenology).
By presupposing (at least a modest form of) scientific realism,
scientific metaphysics retains the ontological element of the
traditional understanding of theory which was abandoned in
the phenomenological approach.
Scientific metaphysicians view mathematization as the road to
objective knowledge, not as a surreptitious substitution of
idealities for the real world.
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Husserl and Scientific Metaphysics: First Parallel
Scientific metaphysicians share Husserl’s adherence to the ideal of
a theoretical attitude that frees those who take it from the bias of
everyday interests. The difference is just that they see this attitude
fully realized in mathematized science, rather than in
transcendental phenomenology.
Fortunately, people learned to represent the world and reason
mathematically—that is, in a manner that enables us to abstract away from
our familiar environment, to a degree that has increased over time as
mathematics has developed—and this has allowed us to achieve scientific
knowledge. (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 2)
This connection appears most clearly in Ladyman’s and Ross’s
appraisal of Weyl’s contribution to quantum mechanics (which
seems to have been profoundly influenced by Husserl):
The central point of philosophical relevance here is that the mathematical
idea of invariance is taken by Weyl to characterize the notion of objectivity. It
is this that liberates physics from the parochial confines of a particular
coordinate system. (146)
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Husserl and Scientific Metaphysics: Second Parallel
Ladyman and Ross subscribe to Husserl’s demand that scientific
theorizing (even in domains without practical application, such as
fundamental physics) ought to have significance for our practical
lives:
The best motivation for trying to synthesize our scientific knowledge into a
unified picture—that is, for building naturalistic metaphysics—is the crucial
service this activity potentially performs in extending the Enlightenment
project. If science is not seen to provide the basis for a general worldview,
then people will continue to collectively confabulate alternative general
pictures. This in turn matters because the confabulated pictures inspire
groundless and usually wasteful and destructive politics and policy. We see
no reason to be coy about the fact that, like the logical positivists, our
philosophizing is inspired by a normative commitment: while acknowledging
the importance of conserving what is valuable, we abhor conservatism,
which we view as a sad refusal to explore the magnificent range of
possibilities that our ability to do mathematics allows us, and thus betrays
the best reason for caring passionately about objective truth. (Ladyman and
Ross 2013, 113)
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Scientific Metaphysics as a Guide to Life?
With respect to Habermas’s critique, scientific metaphysics
seems to be in a better position than Husserl’s approach,
because it retains both the methodological and the ontological
element of the traditional understanding of theory.
Still, there are some obstacles in the way from theory to
life-orientation:
Can we still entertain a notion of metaphysics that is robust
enough to ground practical decisions? (Habermas denies that
we can: “The insight that the truth of statements is linked in the
last analysis to the intention of the good and true life can be
preserved today only on the ruins of ontology” (320).)
How does pure theory acquire practical significance (if not by
Platonic mimesis)?
Ladyman and Ross seem to acknowledge these difficulties in
their distinction between strong metaphysics (which they
reject) and weak metaphysics (which they endorse).
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Scientific Metaphysics as a Guide to Life?
Strong vs. Weak Metaphysics
Strong metaphysics treats philosophical positions as doctrines
and involves claims about the structure of reality that go
beyond what the sciences imply.
Weak metaphysics treats philosophical positions as stances
(in the sense of van Fraassen 2002) and consist in articulating
a unified world-view on the basis of a given stance (the
“scientistic” one in the case of Ladyman and Ross).
The limited role of metaphysics when engaging with people who
resist adopting the scientistic stance:
Their resistance to science, which must be quite thoroughgoing if it is not to
be unprincipled, will confront them with serious policy problems in the
management of social affairs, and we will want to press them as hard as
possible on these. But we would not try to convert them with metaphysics,
for van Fraassen is right that that would require strong metaphysics, and
strong metaphysics can’t get off the ground. (Ladyman and Ross 2007, 64)
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Conclusion
Habermas’s critique brings out the parallel between Husserl’s
philosophy of science and contemporary scientific metaphysics:
Husserl’s expectations towards the theoretical attitude
presupposes more metaphysics than he is prepared to admit.
Conversely, metaphysics is less relevant to practical
decision-making than the rhetoric of scientific metaphysicians
suggests.
This convergence is rooted in the fact that both approaches suffer
from the tension between the ideal of disinterested theorizing and
the demand that such theorizing should matter to our lives.
In contrast, Habermas suggests that our theorizing is never
really disinterested, but is at least guided by what he calls the
emancipatory interest.
This idea deserves further consideration, given that it
responds to a tension present in two approaches to science as
different as Husserl’s and present-day scientific metaphysics.
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Original Quotations
Husserl, Krisis §2:
Die Ausschliesslichkeit, in welcher sich in der 2. Hälfte des 19.
Jahrhunderts die ganze Weltanschauung des modernen Menschen von den
positiven Wissenschaften bestimmen . . . liess, bedeutete ein gleichgültiges
Sichabkehren von den Fragen, die für ein echtes Menschentum die
entscheidenden sind . . . : die Fragen nach Sinn oder Sinnlosigkeit dieses
ganzen menschlichen Daseins. (1976, 3-4)
§9:
Aber nun ist als höchst wichtig zu beachten eine schon bei Galilei sich
vollziehende Unterschiebung der mathematisch substruierten Welt der
Idealitäten für die einzig wirkliche, die wirklich wahrnehmungsmässig
gegebene, die je erfahrene und erfahrbare Welt – unsere alltägliche
Lebenswelt. (49)
Das Ideenkleid “Mathematik und mathematische Naturwissenschaft” . . .
befasst alles, was . . . als die “objektiv wirkliche und wahre” Natur die
Lebenswelt vertritt, sie verkleidet. Das Ideenkleid macht es, dass wir für
wahres Sein nehmen, was eine Methode ist. . . (52)
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Original Quotations
Husserl, Vienna lecture:
. . . in Form universaler verantwortlicher Wissenschaft, in welcher ein völlig
neuer Modus von Wissenschaftlichkeit in den Gang gebracht wird, in dem
alle erdenklichen Fragen, Fragen des Seins und Fragen der Norm, Fragen
der sogenannten Existenz, ihre Stelle finden. (1976, 346)
Habermas, “Erkenntnis und Interesse”:
Theorie im Sinne der grossen Tradition ging darum ins Leben über, weil sie
in der kosmischen Ordnung einen idealen Zusammenhang der Welt, und
das hiess: auch den Prototyp für die Ordnung der Menschenwelt, zu
entdecken vermeinte. Nur als Kosmologie war Theorie zugleich der
Orientierung des Handelns mächtig. (152–153)
Die Einsicht, dass die Wahrheit von Aussagen in letzter Instanz an die
Intention des wahren Lebens gebunden ist, lässt sich heute nur mehr auf
den Trümmern der Ontologie bewahren. (167–168)
